The coevolution of cooperation: Integrating Q-learning and occasional social interactions in evolutionary games

Jiaying Lin, Pinduo Long, Jinfeng Liang, Qionglin Dai, Haihong Li and Junzhong Yang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: This study explores the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolutionary game theory by incorporating occasional social interactions into Q-learning algorithms. We model the dynamics on a square lattice, where individuals play the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and update their strategies based on Q-learning and infrequent social interactions. Our main findings reveal a non-monotonic relationship between the game parameter c and cooperation levels, with cooperation re-emerging in adverse conditions. The interplay between Q-learning and social learning mechanisms is key, with social learning playing a more significant role in sustaining cooperation under challenging conditions. This work advances our understanding of cooperation maintenance in populations and has implications for designing strategies to foster cooperation in real-world scenarios.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; Cooperation; Q-learning algorithm; Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:194:y:2025:i:c:s096007792500178x

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116165

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