The impact of tax-based rewards and mercenary punishment on public goods games

Yong Shen, Zixuan Deng, Hongwei Kang, Xingping Sun and Qingyi Chen

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 199, issue P1

Abstract: Punishments and rewards have long been an inseparable topic in public goods cooperation, but both punishments and rewards will face expensive costs. So how to better apply rewards and punishments is a focal point in the evolution of cooperation. It is widely recognized that punishments tend to be more effective than rewards, but in recent years research has found that pure rewards based on taxes lead to higher levels of cooperation than pure punishments based on taxes. This paper examines the effect of the manner and object of rewards on the public goods game on the basis of taxation. It is found that rewards are more likely to enhance cooperation when they are used directly to increase the gains of cooperators than when they are used to support the survival of a third strategy. And in models that combine rewards and punishments, the use of rewards to support the survival of the third strategy may reduce the effect of the original punishment.

Keywords: Public goods game; Tax; Reward; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:199:y:2025:i:p1:s0960077925006046

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116591

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