Coupling static opinions with evolutionary games: Shaping cooperation in spatial social dilemmas

Lijuan Qin, Yali Zhang, Chunpeng Du, Xiaofang Duan and Yikang Lu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 199, issue P2

Abstract: A fundamental feature of most game-theoretic models coupling opinions is that individuals’ opinions can change during interactions. However, this study explores the impact of static opinions on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). By coupling fixed opinions with strategy interactions on a square lattice, we examine how opinion benefits, the conformity parameter, and group dominance affect cooperative behavior. Simulation results show that higher opinion benefits significantly enhance cooperation by facilitating the formation of cooperator clusters. In addition, the conformity parameter α balances the effects of opinions and strategies. Notably, balanced initial opinion distributions promote stable cooperation, whereas polarized distributions suppress it. These findings highlight the critical role of static opinions in shaping cooperative behavior and offer new insights into the mechanisms of cooperation in structured populations.

Keywords: Static opinion; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:199:y:2025:i:p2:s0960077925007763

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116763

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