Evolution of fully continuous strategies: Spatial Public Goods Game based on Differential Evolution

Hongwei Kang, Yuzeng Guo, Yong Shen, Xingping Sun, Qingyi Chen and Xiangyue Peng

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 200, issue P2

Abstract: The problem of cooperation in Public Goods Games (PGG) has been a research hotspot in many fields. This paper proposes a novel spatial PGG model, where individuals adopt fully continuous investment (I) and reward willingness (R) strategies and, based on dual objectives of economic payoff and remembered reputation, update their strategies through the Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm. Through simulations, we find that the DE algorithm can enhance cooperation levels. We also discuss the performance of two variants of the DE algorithm (DE/best/1 and DE/best/2) in balancing exploration and exploitation. This study broadens the scope for using optimization algorithms to solve complex social dilemmas and contributes to a deeper understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of continuous strategies and the emergence of cooperation in complex systems.

Keywords: Public Goods Game; Differential Evolution Algorithm; Continuous strategies; Reputation mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077925011014
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:200:y:2025:i:p2:s0960077925011014

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117088

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().