 Public goods games with environmental feedbacks in well-mixed and structured populationsJiaying Li, Shaojie Lv and Changheng Zhao Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2025, vol. 201, issue P2 Abstract: The feedback between strategy and environment is ubiquitous ranging from nature and human societies. The previously chosen strategy subsequently changes the environment and associated payoffs. Here, we consider a public goods game with environmental feedback, in which the state of the environment depends on the number of cooperators within the group. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics in both well-mixed and structured populations. Our results show that increases in the strength of environmental feedback (α) and the benchmark multiplication factor (r) facilitate the evolution of cooperation. On the contrary, an increase in the group size hinders the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, when α or r is low, well-mixed populations facilitate the emergence of cooperation. As α or r increases, structured populations are beneficial for cooperators to dominate the whole population. For small group sizes, structured populations more readily evolve into the full-cooperation state. With the increase of group size, well-mixed populations prevent the disappearance of cooperation. Keywords: Evolutionary game; Environmental feedback; Structured populations; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:201:y:2025:i:p2:s0960077925012500 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117237 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
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