Tri-sequential Stackelberg game with defensive switching against deception attacks for networked switched systems

Lili Li, Mengjie Li, Lijun Gao and Yecheng Li

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2026, vol. 202, issue P1

Abstract: In scenarios where deception attacks manipulate both system states and switching signals, controller-based game defenses alone become inadequate. These defenses may struggle to handle more complex attack scenarios where multiple signals are manipulated simultaneously, which can have a broader impact on system behavior and control. To address this limitation, a tri-sequential Stackelberg game model with defensive switching is proposed, where three participants, including the switching rule, deception attacker, and controller, make decisions sequentially. Specifically, the switching rule acts as the first defender, proactively configuring system modes. The deception attacker responds in the second stage by selecting attack strategies, and finally, the controller performs compensatory control actions in response to the detected system behavior. The proposed game model systematically captures the strategic interactions among all participants, implementing both pre-emptive defense before deception attacks occur and post-attack compensation mechanisms. In view of the reverse recursion method, the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies are obtained. Based on these equilibrium strategies, sufficient conditions are derived to ensure system stability under deception attacks. Numerical simulation of the unmanned surface vehicle (USV) demonstrates the validity and superiority of the results.

Keywords: Networked switched systems; Stackelberg game; Switching rule; Deception attacks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:202:y:2026:i:p1:s0960077925014821

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117469

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