The effect of exit cost on the evolution of cooperation in the separable repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Minmin Zhang and Cong Li

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2026, vol. 209, issue P2

Abstract: Cooperation is universally prevalent in both natural and social life. Previous studies have illustrated that enabling individuals to voluntarily terminate interactions with defectors can facilitate the evolution of cooperation, yet the exit cost incurred when individuals end interactions with their opponents has been neglected in most relevant research. To explore the influence mechanism of exit cost on the evolution of cooperation, we developed a theoretical model incorporating subjective exit cost within the framework of the separable repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Our findings revealed that exit cost exerts a significant promotional effect on the evolution of cooperation: with the increase in exit cost, cooperators and defectors stably coexist, and the proportion of cooperators rises remarkably in the state of mixed equilibrium. In addition, when the exit cost surpasses the payoff cost of cooperators in the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Out-for-Tat (OFT) strategy performs better than the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy in driving the evolution of cooperation.

Keywords: Prisoner’s Dilemma game; Evolution of cooperation; Exit cost; Out-for-Tat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077926006557
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:209:y:2026:i:p2:s0960077926006557

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118514

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().