Dynamical systems and the arising of cooperation in a Cournot duopoly

Vittorio Cafagna and Paolo Coccorese

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2005, vol. 25, issue 3, 655-664

Abstract: Using the approach first introduced by Smale, we study a duopolistic market where agents have bounded memory and rationality. A stable cooperative equilibrium is achieved by employing a dynamical system that takes into account repeated interactions between firms and a set of behavioural rules.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:25:y:2005:i:3:p:655-664

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2004.11.051

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