Identifying attributes and insecurity of a public-channel key exchange protocol using chaos synchronization

S. Han, E. Chang, T. Dillon, M. Hwang and Cheng Few Lee

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2009, vol. 40, issue 5, 2569-2575

Abstract: Klein et al. proposed a key exchange protocol using chaos synchronization. The first protocol comprises two parties with chaotic dynamics that are mutually coupled and undergo a synchronization process, at the end of which they can use their identical dynamical state as an encryption key. From cryptographic point of view, their key exchange protocol is a key agreement protocol. Klein et al. claimed that their key agreement can be carried out over a public channel. In order to increase the key space and decrease the precision of the calculation, they made an extension of the system to a network of N Lorenz equations. In this paper, we will provide a cryptanalysis of their key agreement protocol. We will first point out some weaknesses, and then show that their protocol is not secure against several attacks including impersonation attack.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:40:y:2009:i:5:p:2569-2575

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2007.10.050

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