Oligopoly and stability

T. Puu and A. Panchuk

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2009, vol. 41, issue 5, 2505-2516

Abstract: In this paper, the so called Theocharis–Cournot problem is reconsidered. It concerns the relation between oligopoly and perfect competition, in particular the destabilization of Cournot equilibrium when the number of competitors increases. Using a CES production function where one input, capital, is fixed during periods of investment, a mixed short/long run market dynamics is set up. In the short run, with capital fixed, there is a capacity limit for production possibilities, whereas, at moments of capital renewal there are constant returns to scale. In this setting the local stability of Cournot equilibrium is reconsidered. It is demonstrated that if no more than two firms reinvest in the same time period, and the wage rate is not too high, then the Cournot equilibrium is stable.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:41:y:2009:i:5:p:2505-2516

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2008.09.037

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