The evolution of cooperation in mixed games

Lucas Wardil and Jafferson K.L. da Silva

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2013, vol. 56, issue C, 160-165

Abstract: Cooperation has been studied in the context of game evolutionary theory by assuming that individuals play always the same game. Here we consider a mixture of two games G1 and G2. In each interaction of two individuals, they can play the games G1 or G2 with probabilities w and 1-w, respectively. We define the evolutionary model and study the cooperation evolution in a well-mixed population and in a cycle. We show that in the well-mixed population the evolution is equivalent to the evolution given by the average game. In a cycle, we show that the intensity of selection plays an important role in the promotion or inhibition of cooperation, depending on the games that are mixed.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:56:y:2013:i:c:p:160-165

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.018

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