The impact of other-regarding tendencies on the spatial vaccination game

Yan Zhang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2013, vol. 56, issue C, 209-215

Abstract: Using the evolutionary game framework to describe the vaccination behaviors of individuals, this work focuses on the impact of other-regarding tendencies on collective decision-making of vaccination. With extensive computational simulations, we find that when the vaccination cost is small or moderate, the variance of vaccination coverage as well as epidemic size is monotonically depending on the other-regarding effect. However, with a high price of vaccine, a moderate deviation from being entirely self-centered results in a poor communal vaccination benefit. In addition, we also find that the other-regarding effect may lead to an optimal total social cost.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:56:y:2013:i:c:p:209-215

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.08.014

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