The effects of nonlinear imitation probability on the evolution of cooperation

Qionglin Dai, Haihong Li, Hongyan Cheng, Mei Zhang and Junzhong Yang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2013, vol. 56, issue C, 53-58

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a nonlinear imitation rule into an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game and investigate how the nonlinear imitation rule affects cooperation. Based on the original version of the proportional imitation rule, the imitation probability for each individual is regulated by a parameter α, which tunes the dependence of the imitation probability on the payoff difference. The results show that there exists an optimal value of α at which the cooperation level reaches its highest value. We carry out the simulations in different types of networks with different mean degrees. Results show that the optimal behavior of cooperation induced by the variation of α is robust. More importantly, from the results we can conclude that there are two crucial factors determining the optimal behavior of cooperation: One is the parameter α, and the other is the regime of payoff difference supporting strong variation of the dependence of the imitation probability on the payoff difference.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077913001252
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:56:y:2013:i:c:p:53-58

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.001

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().