 Understanding herding based on a co-evolutionary model for strategy and game structureTao Wang, Keke Huang, Yuan Cheng and Xiaoping Zheng Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2015, vol. 75, issue C, 84-90 Abstract: So far, there has been no conclusion on the mechanism for herding, which is often discussed in the academia. Assuming escaping behavior of individuals in emergency is rational rather than out of panic according to recent findings in social psychology, we investigate the behavioral evolution of large crowds from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Specifically, evolution of the whole population divided into two subpopulations, namely the co-evolution of strategy and game structure, is numerically simulated based on the game theoretical models built and the evolutionary rule designed, and a series of phenomena including extinction of one subpopulation and herding effect are predicted in the proposed framework. Furthermore, if the rewarding for rational agents becomes significantly larger than that for emotional ones, herding effect will disappear. It is exciting that some phase transition points with interesting properties for the system can be found. In addition, our model framework is able to explain the fact that it is difficult for mavericks to prevail in society. The current results of this work will be helpful in understanding and restraining herding effect in real life. Date: 2015 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:84-90 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2015.02.008 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
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