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Exchange trading rules, surveillance and suspected insider trading

Michael Aitken, Douglas Cumming () and Feng Zhan

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015, vol. 34, issue C, 311-330

Abstract: We examine the impact of stock exchange trading rules and surveillance on the frequency and severity of suspected insider trading cases in 22 stock exchanges around the world over the period January 2003 through June 2011. Using new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict based on the specific provisions of the trading rules of each stock exchange, along with surveillance to detect non-compliance with such rules, we show that more detailed exchange trading rules and surveillance over time and across markets significantly reduce the number of suspected cases, but increase the profits per suspected case.

Keywords: Insider trading; Surveillance; Exchange trading rules; Law and finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G14 G18 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:34:y:2015:i:c:p:311-330

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.013

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