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Insider ownership and dividend policy in an imputation tax environment

Balasingham Balachandran, Arifur Khan, Paul Mather and Michael Theobald

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2019, vol. 54, issue C, 153-167

Abstract: Firms are more likely to pay dividends with higher payout ratios in an imputation environment. The effects of profitability and earned/contributed capital mix on the decision to pay dividends and dividend payout are weaker for firms following imputation tax system than traditional tax system. Insider ownership is positively related to the decision to pay dividends and dividend payout and this effect does not vary between traditional and imputation tax systems. Firms with higher foreign institutional ownership are less likely to pay dividends and have lower payout ratios. The study demonstrates the significance of the imputation tax system upon dividend policy.

Keywords: Agency costs; Insider ownership; Imputation tax system; Franked dividend; Unfranked dividend; Institutional ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:54:y:2019:i:c:p:153-167

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.014

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