Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan

Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov

Journal of Development Economics, 2017, vol. 124, issue C, 199-213

Abstract: Direct democracy is designed to better align policy outcomes with citizen preferences. To test this proposition, we randomized whether 250 villages across Afghanistan selected projects by secret-ballot referenda or by consultation meetings. We find that referenda reduce the influence of local elites over both project type and location. Consistent with previous experimental results, we also find that referenda improve villagers' perceptions of the local economy and of the quality of local governance. However, we find no systematic evidence that selecting projects via referenda increases the average impact of such projects.

Keywords: Political institutions; Field experiment; Electoral system; Direct democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan (2013)
Working Paper: Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:124:y:2017:i:c:p:199-213

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.10.001

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