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Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan

Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia () and Ruben Enikolopov
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Fotini Christia: Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

No w0192, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Abstract: Direct democracy is designed to better align policy outcomes with citizen preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250 villages across Afghanistan, we compare outcomes of the selection of village-level development projects through secret-ballot referenda and through consultation meetings. We find that elites exert more influence over resource allocation decisions in consultation meetings as compared with referenda. Referenda also improve public satisfaction. The results indicate that the use of direct democracy in public resource allocation mitigates elite capture and results in more legitimate outcomes than those produced by less representative consultative processes.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-exp and nep-pol
Date: 2013-01
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Journal Article: Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Direct democracy and resource allocation: experimental evidence from Afghanistan (2012) Downloads
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