Economics at your fingertips  

A theory of regional conflict complexes

Arthur Silve and Thierry Verdier

Journal of Development Economics, 2018, vol. 133, issue C, 434-447

Abstract: Civil conflicts spill over into neighboring countries. This paper proposes a theory of the contagion of civil wars. Weak territorial control facilitates the emergence of a regional market for war inputs in the “porous frontier.” The contagion effect is nonlinear and creates multiple equilibrium situations of regional complexes of civil conflicts. This helps explain the observed patterns of regional clustering of conflict and institutional quality, and raises identification issues in the measurement of the contagion effect. We also derive a positive spillover of civil wars: governments are sometimes in a position to avoid contagion by improving their institutions. Finally, we explore the policy implications for military intervention, and military and institutional cooperation.

Keywords: Civil war; Contagion; Porous frontier; Institutions; Military intervention; Institutional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N40 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig

More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2019-05-06
Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:133:y:2018:i:c:p:434-447