Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief

Shawn Cole, Andrew Healy () and Eric Werker

Journal of Development Economics, 2012, vol. 97, issue 2, 167-181

Abstract: Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.

Keywords: Political economy; Government expenditures; Disaster relief; India; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H50 H59 O43 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (133)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:97:y:2012:i:2:p:167-181

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.05.005

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