EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk

Eric Fesselmeyer () and Marc Santugini

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2013, vol. 37, issue 1, 125-136

Abstract: We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened.

Keywords: Conservation; Dynamic games; Environmental risk; Renewable resources; Tragedy of the commons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D90 L13 O13 Q20 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188912001467
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:1:p:125-136

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.010

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

 
Page updated 2020-10-14
Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:1:p:125-136