Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk
Eric Fesselmeyer () and
Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE
We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened.
Keywords: Conservation; Dynamic games; Environmental risk; Renewable resources; Tragedy of the Commons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D90 L13 O13 Q20 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1131
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