 Multi-agent, multi-site resource allocation under quotas with a Stackelberg leader and network externalitiesPetros Xepapadeas Economic Modelling, 2023, vol. 121, issue C Abstract: We model multi-agent resource allocations consisting of many agents and sites, analyze serial dictatorship and simultaneous allocation approaches, and then apply them to an actual case of mussel harvesting. For tractability, the model is developed in the context of a multi-fisher, multi-site fishery where one fisher may emerge as a Stackelberg leader while the rest are followers, but the generalized model can be used to study many other resource allocation problems. Network externalities are introduced in the form of congestion costs, and management systems based on individual and collective quotas are analyzed. The presence of a Stackelberg leader is a novel approach that extends results obtained in resource allocation and indicates the possibility of full elimination of followers, with impacts on the sustainability of fishing communities. We compare allocation outcomes under different assumptions and discuss policies that could prevent the followers from exiting the market. Keywords: Multi-agent resource allocations; Individual and collective quotas; Stackelberg leader; Cooperative outcomes; Nash equilibrium; Congestion costs (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:121:y:2023:i:c:s026499932300038x DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106226 Access Statistics for this article Economic Modelling is currently edited by S. Hall and P. Pauly More articles in Economic Modelling from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.