Workers’ firm in mixed duopoly
Flavio Delbono,
Diego Lanzi and
Carlo Reggiani
Economic Modelling, 2023, vol. 122, issue C
Abstract:
Cooperatives, including those owned and run by workers (Workers Firms, WFs), compete with capitalist firms in oligopolistic industries (mixed oligopolies). We rationalize several facts emerging from the empirical research as: The concern of WFs for their employment; the interplay between membership and workplace safeguard within WFs; the different reaction to shocks between WFs and capitalist enterprises. We do so by means of a new model of WFs’ short-run behavior in a mixed duopoly. We innovate in modeling the WF’s objective function by including both profits and employment, and characterize the resulting Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Workers’ firm; Labor-managed firms; Employment; Oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L21 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:122:y:2023:i:c:s0264999323000597
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106247
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