Monetary and macroprudential policies: How to Be green? A political-economy approach

Donato Masciandaro and Riccardo Russo

Economic Modelling, 2024, vol. 141, issue C

Abstract: This study examines the trade-offs that central banks would face if they began addressing climate change. The various instruments available to address climate-related risks overlap with those currently used for monetary and macroprudential purposes. However, most existing literature fails to adequately consider the political-economy aspect of this phenomenon. This creates a bias in favor of interventions by central banks. Using a political principal–agent setting that eliminates this bias, we examine the conditions under which the central bank architecture could effectively pursue this goal without compromising its core mandates. The effectiveness of central banks depends on their ability to calibrate, maintain independence and demonstrate a degree of activism.

Keywords: Principal–agent setting; Monetary policy; Macroprudential policy; Climate change; Central bank independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:141:y:2024:i:c:s0264999324002888

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106931

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