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Optimal contract design and securities implementation with dynamic investment and learning

Yuqian Zhang

Economic Modelling, 2025, vol. 152, issue C

Abstract: This paper builds on the traditional principal–agent framework by incorporating dynamic investment decisions and Bayesian learning mechanisms. The model is especially relevant for small and medium-sized enterprises, where we examine the interaction between investors and managers as both investment opportunities and information about firm fundamentals evolve concurrently. The framework combines the dynamic relationship between investment decisions and contractual specifications into a unified differential equation that uses information rent as the primary state variable. Our findings show that investment strategies and contractual terms change dynamically in response to past cash flow patterns and accumulated information rents. Greater uncertainty reduces the signal-to-noise ratio in cash flows, making it more challenging to distinguish between effort and underlying fundamentals. The resulting degradation in contractual efficiency occurs through two mechanisms: directly through costlier incentive provision, and indirectly through distorted investment decisions based on noisier information. To address these challenges, we propose practical securities implementations that combine performance-sensitive credit facilities and equity conversion terms.

Keywords: Optimal investment; Security design; Dynamic contracts; Bayesian learning; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 E24 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:152:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325002305

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107235

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