Commitment for storable goods under vertical integration

Pu-yan Nie

Economic Modelling, 2009, vol. 26, issue 2, 414-417

Abstract: The role of commitment under monopoly for storable goods has been fully considered in many papers. In general, if the monopolist with storable goods cannot commit, the prices are higher than in the case in which the monopolist launches commitment. According to the discrete-time dynamic model, commitment for storable goods under vertically integrated structures is considered in this paper. The similar results to the monopoly are correspondingly obtained. Namely, the prices without commitment are also higher than that with commitment under vertical integration.

Keywords: Market; structure; Industrial; organization; Storable; goods; Commitment; Game; theory; Vertical; integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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