Innovation, licensing, and price vs. quantity competition

Changying Li () and Xiaoming Ji

Economic Modelling, 2010, vol. 27, issue 3, 746-754

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that, with licensing, the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) is completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover, Cournot competition leads to lower prices, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare than Bertrand competition.

Keywords: Cost-reducing; innovation; Licensing; Cournot; competition; Bertrand; competition; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:27:y:2010:i:3:p:746-754

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