On labour mobility and the neutrality of money in unionised economies

Anna Larsson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Seim

Economic Modelling, 2011, vol. 28, issue 1, 396-403

Abstract: A recent literature suggests that when wage setters are non-atomistic, strategic interaction between trade unions and the central bank may cause the monetary regime to matter for the labour market outcome, see Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Soskice and Iversen (2000), Vartiainen (2002), Holden (2003), Lippi (2003), Corricelli et al. (2006), Gnocchi (2006) and references therein. I show that when perfect labour mobility is introduced in a game between large wage setters and the central bank in a small open economy, the monetary regime is of no importance for real wages, employment or profits. The result suggests that if labour mobility is sufficiently high, worker migration is likely to mitigate the labour market effects of monetary regimes over time.

Keywords: Inflation targeting; Monetary union; Labour mobility; Neutrality of money (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: On labour mobility and the neutrality of money in unionised economies (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:1:p:396-403

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2010.08.009

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