How does bargaining power affect remittances?

R. Aísa, Joaquin Andaluz and Gemma Larramona

Economic Modelling, 2011, vol. 28, issue 1, 47-54

Abstract: This paper examines the factors affecting the amount of remittances by migrants to their home countries, in a context of a family bargaining model. Spanish data does not show the same clear relationship between remittances and migrant income that is captured in the theoretical literature and certain empirical papers. Family bargaining models emerge as a useful framework within which to study remittances, and bargaining power is a key element in determining the level of such remittances. As a consequence of the consideration of bargaining power, the effect of income levels on remittances emerges as non-monotonic.

Keywords: Remittances; Family bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D13 F24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:1:p:47-54

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2010.10.001

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