Equilibrium locations in a mixed duopoly with sequential entry in real time
Changying Li () and
Economic Modelling, 2011, vol. 28, issue 3, 1211-1218
We investigate a mixed duopoly model where a public firm and a private firm enter a market sequentially over an infinite time horizon, with and without uncertainty over the follower's entry date. We assume that there is a unit-length linear city and show that, if the public firm moves first, equilibrium location falls inside the second and third quartiles. The later the follower is expected to enter, the closer the two firms are. However, if the private firm acts first, it moves aggressively to locate at the middle point (one-half), forcing the public firm to locate nearer the periphery (one-sixth), to minimize consumers' transportation cost. In addition, social welfare is strictly greater when the public firm moves as the leader.
Keywords: Location; Sequential; entry; Time; Mixed; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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