Monopoly, economic efficiency and unemployment

Bo Zhao

Economic Modelling, 2012, vol. 29, issue 3, 586-600

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency consequences of monopoly from the perspective of an efficiency-wage model of unemployment based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An important feature of our model is that a firm can raise the probability that a shirking worker is detected by increasing its effort or investment in the monitoring of workers. Using this model we study how a monopolist's decision with regard to employment, output and monitoring is affected by exogenous variables such as job separation rate, technological advances, market size, and unemployment benefits. Furthermore, by comparing with the competitive equilibrium we find that monopoly is associated with higher unemployment rate, smaller output, and less monitoring. Surprisingly, however, monopoly does not necessarily lead to lower welfare level.

Keywords: Monopoly; Efficiency loss; Unemployment; Efficiency wage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:29:y:2012:i:3:p:586-600

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.01.001

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