Strategic correlativity and network games

Jianxia Yang () and John Wu ()

Economic Modelling, 2013, vol. 30, issue C, 663-669

Abstract: We consider the strategic correlativity principle in strategic form games and potential games, which indicate the relationship between an arbitrary pair of players under correlated equilibria. Importantly, the strategies of a pair of players are positively correlated when their expected payoff functions are supermodular, while negatively correlated when their expected payoff functions are submodular. Furthermore, we extend the strategic correlativity principle to strategic form games and potential games in social networks, and investigate the monotonicity of correlated equilibrium in each player's own degree.

Keywords: Strategic correlativity; Potential games; Network games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:663-669

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.09.025

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