Political stability, corruption and trust in politicians

Ingmar Schumacher

Economic Modelling, 2013, vol. 31, issue C, 359-369

Abstract: In this article we develop a dynamic model where an endogenous evolution of trust impacts a politician's choice for bribe-taking and tax re-distribution. The politician obtains utility from net income that comes from his wage income, tax embezzlements and bribe-taking, and he also has incentives for tax re-distribution. The higher the tax embezzlements and the more bribes the politician takes the lower his citizens' trust and the less likely will he be re-elected. We support the evolution of trust with an econometric investigation.

Keywords: Trust; Corruption; Political stability; Bribe; Dynamic model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 E10 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Political Stability, Corruption and Trust in Politicians (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:359-369

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.047

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