Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

Antoine Bouët and Patrice Cassagnard

Economic Modelling, 2013, vol. 32, issue C, 286-293

Abstract: The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.

Keywords: Cournot duopoly; International trade; Adverse selection; Screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:286-293

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.02.024

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