Trade reform, intermediation and corruption

Biswajit Mandal and Sugata Marjit

Economic Modelling, 2013, vol. 33, issue C, 741-746

Abstract: We construct a general equilibrium model with a protected intermediate sector and analyze the effectiveness of trade reform for a small open economy where bureaucratic corruption arises because of trade protection. Intermediaries are employed by the producers in order to avoid paying the import tariff. We use an HOSV kind of framework to prove whether trade liberalization necessarily leads to a decline in intermediation activities. We find that labor intensity of the exportable commodity which uses the intermediate good is critical in determining the extent of corruption. It is essentially a tug of war between higher tariff revenue and higher wage in the new equilibrium. Thus trade liberalization may or may not lead to less corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; International trade; Tariff reform; General equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D5 D73 F1 F11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:741-746

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.05.022

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