Government debt, inflation dynamics and the transmission of fiscal policy shocks
Eric Mayer,
Sebastian Rüth and
Johann Scharler
Economic Modelling, 2013, vol. 33, issue C, 762-771
Abstract:
We analyze the influence of the fiscal position on the transmission of government spending shocks in a New Keynesian model. We find that once we allow for positive levels of government debt in the steady state, the size of the fiscal multiplier depends strongly on the horizon at which the multiplier is evaluated. While the long-run effect of a fiscal policy innovation is typically of a similar order of magnitude as in Galí et al. (2007), short-run multipliers differ substantially. The reason for this non-monotonic behavior is the interaction between the dynamics of the inflation rate and the debt level in real terms for sufficiently high levels of government debt in the steady state.
Keywords: Fiscal multiplier; New Keynesian model; Government debt; Inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E62 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Government debt, inflation dynamics and the transmission of fiscal policy shocks (2012) 
Working Paper: Government debt, inflation dynamics and the transmission of fiscal policy shocks (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:762-771
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.05.011
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