Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis

Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu () and Luca Zarri

Economic Modelling, 2014, vol. 42, issue C, 106-115

Abstract: We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.

Keywords: Behavioral heterogeneity; Cheating; Evolutionary game theory; Peer punishment; Public goods game; Tax morale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:106-115

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.002

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