On the efficiency of private and state-owned enterprises in mixed markets

Xuan Nguyen

Economic Modelling, 2015, vol. 50, issue C, 130-137

Abstract: We examine oligopoly models of vertical product differentiation in which producing firms face variable costs of quality development. We show that comparing to private oligopoly, mixed oligopoly – whereby state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms coexist – enhances social welfare but reduces firms' profitability. We also demonstrate that Bertrand competition makes firms better off under mixed oligopoly but it makes firms worse off under private oligopoly compared with Cournot competition. These findings help to justify both the existence of SOEs and the efficiency of SOEs and private firms in mixed markets in transitional economies.

Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; Product differentiation; Quality; State-owned enterprises; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999315001583
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:130-137

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2015.06.011

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Modelling is currently edited by S. Hall and P. Pauly

More articles in Economic Modelling from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().