Counterfeit quality and verification in a monetary exchange

Enchuan Shao and Ben Fung

Economic Modelling, 2016, vol. 52, issue PA, 13-25

Abstract: Recent studies on counterfeiting in a monetary search framework show that counterfeiting does not occur in a monetary equilibrium. These findings are contrary to the observation that counterfeiting of bank notes in some countries has recently experienced rapid increases. In this paper, we construct a model of counterfeiting in which counterfeiting can exist as an equilibrium outcome. A competitive search environment is employed in which sellers post offers and buyers direct their search based on posted offers. When sellers are uninformed, their offers are pooling and thus buyers can extract some rents by using counterfeit money. Therefore, counterfeit notes can coexist with genuine notes under certain conditions. We also explicitly model the interaction between sellers' verification decisions and counterfeiters' choices of counterfeit quality. This allows us to better understand how policies can affect counterfeiting.

Keywords: Money; Search; Counterfeiting; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Counterfeit Quality and Verification in a Monetary Exchange (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:52:y:2016:i:pa:p:13-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2015.07.003

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