 Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formationYasunori Ouchida () and Daisaku Goto Economic Modelling, 2016, vol. 55, issue C, 179-188 Abstract: This paper provides a new analytical framework of endogenous choice for environmental R&D formation. Furthermore, this paper presents an examination of environmental R&D of four types in a Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. Results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, or given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then social welfare under environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is higher than in the other three scenarios: environmental R&D competition, environmental R&D cartelization, and ERJV competition. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm's R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially superior to any of the other three scenarios, although R&D competition is a case without information sharing and R&D coordination. Keywords: Environmental research joint venture; Environmental R&D; Time-consistent emission tax; Competition policy; Cournot duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:55:y:2016:i:c:p:179-188 DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.025 Access Statistics for this article Economic Modelling is currently edited by S. Hall and P. Pauly More articles in Economic Modelling from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.