Momentum in dynamic contests
Nicolas de Roos () and
Economic Modelling, 2018, vol. 70, issue C, 401-416
We consider a two-player advertising race subject to momentum. Momentum is modeled as a complementarity between current and past campaign spending in a way that is reminiscent of models of addiction and habit formation: the more effective a player’s past spending has been, the more effective her future spending will be. For symmetric races in which the effectiveness of spending is of the Cobb-Douglas form, we derive analytic solutions for the equilibrium path. Our theory rationalizes alternative campaign strategies including aggressive openings and the development of a warchest for a final campaign assault.
Keywords: Momentum; Differential games; Advertising games; Political campaigns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 M37 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:70:y:2018:i:c:p:401-416
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Modelling is currently edited by S. Hall and P. Pauly
More articles in Economic Modelling from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().