 Intellectual property right infringement, state involvement in industrial espionage, and North-South tradeSang-Kee Kim Economic Modelling, 2020, vol. 91, issue C, 110-116 Abstract: Despite the recent trade war triggered largely by Chinese firms’ intellectual property infringement, the literature on the role of state-sponsored industrial espionage in the trade war is limited. To explore this, we construct an endogenous choice game where a South government chooses whether to support a domestic firm’s industrial espionage while a North government chooses whether to retaliate with a tariff. The main finding shows that cooperation between countries (no infringement/no tariff) leads to a higher level of social welfare than under a trade war. In addition, cooperation is more stable when the South government has a stronger tendency to support its domestic firm’s intellectual property infringement. However, the cooperation becomes less stable as the technology gap between the countries narrows. Our findings help predict that the ongoing trade war between the United States and China will continue if China narrows the technology gap. Keywords: Industrial espionage; Intellectual property protection; State involvement; The United States-China Trade war; North-south trade (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:91:y:2020:i:c:p:110-116 DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.05.026 Access Statistics for this article Economic Modelling is currently edited by S. Hall and P. Pauly More articles in Economic Modelling from Elsevier |
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