Do Chinese executives reward for luck?

Xiaodan Shang, Chuanjian Luo and Qian Wen

Economic Modelling, 2020, vol. 92, issue C, 318-325

Abstract: This paper examines the sensitivity of executive compensation to luck based on Chinese listed companies. To identify the causal effect, we rely on companies’ market performances driven by exogenous oil prices. We document a positive relationship between executive compensation and market performance driven by oil prices, which support the story of pay for luck. Moreover, by introducing a natural experiment China in 2015, i.e., the policy of “CEO compensation limit” in state-owned firms, we show that the shock of CEO compensation limit significantly weakens the effect of pay-for-luck. We further show that there is asymmetry in pay for luck. Specifically, when oil prices rise, executive compensation is more sensitive to good luck. In addition, the sensitivity of executives to pay-for-luck is more pronounced in firms with state-owned, higher equity concentration, and related party transaction.

Keywords: Pay-for-Luck; Executive compensation; Oil price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:92:y:2020:i:c:p:318-325

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.01.012

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