The role of information in the take-up of student loans

Adam S. Booij, Edwin Leuven and Hessel Oosterbeek

Economics of Education Review, 2012, vol. 31, issue 1, 33-44

Abstract: We study student loan behavior in the Netherlands where (i) higher education students know little about the conditions of the government's financial aid program and (ii) take-up rates are low. In a field experiment we manipulated the amount of information students have about these conditions. The treatment has no impact on loan take-up, which is not due to students already having decided to take a loan or students not absorbing the information. We conclude that a lack of knowledge about specific policy parameters does not necessarily imply a binding information constraint.

Keywords: Field experiment; Student debt; Student loans; Loan conditions; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I22 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The role of information in the take-up of student loans (2010)
Working Paper: The Role of Information in the Take-up of Student Loans (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:31:y:2012:i:1:p:33-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.08.009

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