Incentives from curriculum tracking

Kristian Koerselman

Economics of Education Review, 2013, vol. 32, issue C, 140-150

Abstract: Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education.

Keywords: Incentives; Curriculum tracking; High-stakes testing; Student achievement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I28 J08 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:140-150

DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.08.003

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