Conditional cash transfers and education quality in the presence of credit constraints
Elena Del Rey and
Fernanda Estevan
Economics of Education Review, 2013, vol. 34, issue C, 76-84
Abstract:
We investigate the relative merits of unconditional cash transfers (UCT), conditional cash transfers (CCT), and the effects of improvements in education quality on efficiency and welfare. In our setting, some parents underinvest in their children's education because capital market imperfections prevent them from borrowing. Under sufficiently accurate targeting, CCT are more effective than UCT in enhancing the efficiency of these households’ decisions. However, UCT is superior to CCT in terms of welfare unless targeting is perfect, in which case UCT and CCT are equivalent. Education quality is welfare improving, but may not be efficiency enhancing when public education quality is very low.
Keywords: Conditional cash transfers; Public education; Education quality; Unconditional cash transfers; Credit constraint; Efficiency; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H31 H42 H52 I25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775713000198
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education Quality in the Presence of Credit Constraints (2011) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:34:y:2013:i:c:p:76-84
DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.01.006
Access Statistics for this article
Economics of Education Review is currently edited by E. Cohn
More articles in Economics of Education Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().