 Residence-based priorities and school choiceLucas Gortázar, David Mayor and José Montalbán Economics of Education Review, 2023, vol. 95, issue C Abstract: Many countries use centralized school choice procedures to assign pupils to schools. To address excess demand for a particular school, ties are broken according to priority points granted based on various criteria, such as proximity to the school. Using a unique reform undertaken in Madrid (Spain), we estimate the impact of abolishing residence-based priorities on families’ school choices, the stated motivation for choosing a school, and the final school allocation. Utilizing several administrative datasets on school applications, we find that the reform increases families’ out-of-district school assignments and assignments to schools further away from their home address. Parents of immigrant children did not change their application behavior in the first years of the reform but caught up with natives three years after its implementation. Children generally accessed slightly better-performing schools, particularly those from lower-educated backgrounds. Keywords: Education and inequality; School choice; Boston mechanism; Priorities (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:95:y:2023:i:c:s0272775723000316 DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2023.102384 Access Statistics for this article Economics of Education Review is currently edited by E. Cohn More articles in Economics of Education Review from Elsevier |
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