Incentivising Participation and Spatial Coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Service Schemes: Forest Disease Control Programs in Finland
Enni Ruokamo (),
Rauli Svento and
Nick Hanley ()
Ecological Economics, 2018, vol. 152, issue C, 260-272
This paper considers the problem of designing PES-type contracts to encourage participation and spatial coordination amongst private forest owners in Finland. The aim of the policy is to increase efforts to mitigate risks from invasive forest pests and diseases. Such control actions yield spill-over benefits to other landowners and to wider society, meaning that the level of privately-optimal disease control is likely to be less than the socially-optimal level. The policy designer may wish to encourage spatial coordination in the uptake of such PES-type contracts, as spatial coordination delivers an increase in the effectiveness of control measures on disease risks. We conducted a choice experiment with private forest owners in Finland in October 2016. The study elicited the preferences of woodland owners with respect to the design of forest disease control contracts, and gauged their willingness to cooperate with neighbouring forest owners within the framework of such programs.
Keywords: Choice Experiment; Payments for Ecosystem Services; Forest Pests and Diseases; Disease Control Measures; Spatial Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 Q23 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Incentivising participation and spatial coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Service schemes: forest disease control programs in Finland (2018)
Working Paper: Incentivising Participation and Spatial Coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Service Schemes:Forest Disease Control Programs in Finland (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:152:y:2018:i:c:p:260-272
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