A bargaining experiment under weak property rights, with implications for indigenous title claims

Kevin Berry, Anthony Delmond, Rémi Morin Chassé, John C. Strandholm and Jason Shogren

Ecological Economics, 2022, vol. 198, issue C

Abstract: We explore how three parties bargain over a windfall created by a development project given negative spillover on only one party's property. We compare how weak and strong property rights affect negotiation outcomes and fairness. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With weak rights, parties reimburse costs and divide surplus so the developer is simply indifferent, nothing more. These results are meaningful for Indigenous in Canada: without strong property rights, the Crown's duty to consult may still yield dissatisfaction because of improper compensation.

Keywords: Property rights; Resource development; 3-Player bargaining experiment; Veto; Indigenous peoples (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:198:y:2022:i:c:s0921800922001197

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107457

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